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vAbstract
This paper examines the relationship between public investment and its financing 
on private investment in Kenya for the period 1964-2006. Using an error correction 
framework and time series data for the fiscal years 1964-2006, the study shows that 
investment in agriculture has a significant positive effect on private investment, while 
domestic debt has a significant negative effect. Political risk, real exchange rate, external 
debt, and tax though negatively related are insignificant. Investment in infrastructure has 
an insignificant positive effect. These findings have important policy implications that 
investment in agriculture crowds-in private investment. To encourage private investment, 
the government should channel increased resources to the agricultural sector. Domestic 
debt crowds-out private investment, thus the government should reduce its dependence 
on domestic borrowing to finance budget deficit. 
JEL classification: 
Key words: Public expenditure, tax and debt financing, private investment, 
 error correction.
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1. Introduction
Background
On attaining independence, the Government of Kenya sought the path of rapid economic growth to meet some of the challenges it was facing. Among the measures adopted 
to realize this rapid growth were deliberate incentives to the private sector. The result of 
these bold measures was a steady growth in private investment during the first decade of 
independence by an average of 15.76% of GDP. The second decade had a mixed trend, 
but the average growth remained relatively high at 17.56% of GDP, with most of this 
growth coming in the early part of the second decade. The third decade saw the annual 
growth decline to 16.47% of GDP, while the fourth decade witnessed a marked decline 
in private investment to 12.01% of GDP. Public investment grew at an average rate of 
7.74% in the first decade, 9.78% of GDP in the second decade, 8.39% of GDP in the 
third, and 5.14% of GDP in the fourth decade. The growth in GDP can be characterized 
as generally high during the first decade, except for 1970. It averaged 5.82% in the first 
decade, 4.13% in the second decade, and 3.65% in the third decade. Most of the declines in 
this phase were witnessed in the later part. In the fourth decade, GDP growth was 5.63%; 
this was the first half of the National Alliance of Rainbow Coalition (NARC) regime. 
The overall general decline was attributed to inappropriate policies, inadequate credit 
and poor international terms of trade, lack of export incentives, tight import controls, 
and foreign exchange controls. Other factors contributing to the slow growth were poor 
infrastructure, high power costs, increased power outages, increased fuel costs, and high 
levels of uncertainty associated with political trends in Kenya. The political scenario 
witnessed increased political intolerance, and increased political agitation for liberal 
political dispensation. These broad trends are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Selected economic indicators, 1964-2006
 1964-1973  1974-1985 1986-2002 2003-2006
Real exchange rate 7.58 10.23 49.98 76.85
Private investments* 15.76 17.56 16.47 12.01
Public investments* 7.74 9.78 8.39 5.14
GDP 5.82 4.13 3.65 5.63
Investment in agriculture* 0.95 3.47 5.22 9.66
Investment in Infrastructure* 8.11 5.95 6.88 10.26
External debt* 2.96 5.99 38.42 37.92
Domestic debt* 1.52 3.16 16.13 12.15
continued next page
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patronage expenditure added pressure on interest rates. The economy got a brief reprieve 
in 2003 when NARC came into power. This was shortlived as NARC was a loose 
coalition of interests without a coherent long term strategy. Thus, it was no wonder that 
the constitutional referendum in 2005 provided a perfect opportunity for the split in the 
already dysfunctional coalition. The fiscal indiscipline of the KANU regime repeated 
itself as indicated by increased recurrent expenditure and the financial scandals. 
Many critics argue that the NARC government was politically a repackaged KANU. 
Although the repackaging was based on a reform platform, there was no collective will 
to conclusively carry out the reforms, as the reformers were mainly last minute converts 
due to the NARC euphoria, and for very personal political reasons. They remained 
ideologically rooted in KANU’s non-reform philosophy. This argument finds further 
credence in the fact that the NARC leadership comprised of a galaxy of former KANU 
stalwarts. It is further argued that the so-called reform-minded wing of KANU that walked 
out had really no reform agenda nor ideological persuasion. NARC was thus a strong 
KANU minus the chairman. From this argument, one may therefore look at Kenya as 
having two broad regimes for the period 1964-2006.
The period 1964-1982 marks the first regime. In this regime, there were two presidents 
(Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi) but same ideological leaning, broadly the same 
power brokers and the same philosophy. This period was characterized by a strong central 
government and strong patronage politics. It is a period characterized by controls, both on 
macroeconomics and political power. Dissenting views were not tolerated, and the country 
became a single-party state, first de-facto and later de-jure (Troup and Hornsby, 1998). 
The period 1983-2002 witnessed an ideological shift. The attempted coup in August 
1982 provided the real ground for Moi to exert his authority and marked a noticeable 
shift in political behaviour from his predecessor. There was a shift in power base from 
those perceived to have been close to the predecessor to a new crop of leaders who 
owed total allegiance to the incumbent. This period also saw the structural adjustment 
period and the democratization wave sweeping across the world. It marked the end of 
the Cold war and America’s strong push for more democratic space. The agitation for the 
repeal of Section 2A of the Constitution, which made Kenya a single-party democracy 
intensified. Relations with the donors got strained to the extent that the Paris Club 
suspended lending to Kenya. This only made the regime more intolerant. Fiscal discipline 
gave way to "political discipline" (sycophancy), increased patronage expenditure and 
political repression. With the donors’ sustained pressure on the regime, Section 2A was 
repealed in 1991 to pave way for the first multiparty elections.
With the repeal of Section 2A, the government changed its tactics to benevolent 
dictatorship, rewarding those who supported it and punishing those who did not. The 
crackdown on political dissent became more severe, and ethnic balkanization slowly 
replaced political balkanization with the adverse consequence of ethnicized politics and 
expenditure trends. It further gave rise to ethnic tension, which occasionally played itself 
out in ethnic violence. In the latter years of this period, politics took a strongly ethnic 
leaning as the many parties formed found their strongholds in ethnic blocs. Elections 
became more and more violent and ethnic clashes became frequent. Public expenditure 
became a tool for coalition building to win elections, rather than achieving its basic goal 
of provision of public goods and services. 
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 1964-1973  1974-1985 1986-2002 2003-2006
Total tax* 14.98 21.73 24.51 19.18
Political risk 5.32 7.75 8.54 3.83
Source: Government of Kenya Statistical Abstracts (various issues); World Development Indicators (various 
issues); African Development Indicators (various issues); International Financial Statistics; The PRS Group; 
Nordal (2001)
It is important to highlight some of the policies and external factors influencing the 
above trends in Kenya. The fiscal framework can be divided into three phases:
(i) The pre-crisis period (1964-1973). During this period, the economy witnessed a 
mixed growth performance. Favourable factors included increased investment of 
smallholder farmers, favourable incentive structures, low rates of inflation, and 
unrestricted trade (Ronge and Kimuyu, 1997);
(ii) The oil crisis and post-oil crisis of 1973-1985. The economy succumbed to the first 
oil crisis in 1973/1974, leading to the first ever balance of payment (BOP) crisis. 
In order to contain the situation, the government undertook comprehensive import 
restrictions and price controls. The 1978 coffee boom temporarily eased the crisis 
but was shortlived. However, the boom worsened the fiscal account as it led to an 
expansion in public expenditure, which could not be sustained beyond the boom and 
could not be reversed either. The economy suffered a second oil shock in 1979/1980. 
The government changed from being a net provider of investment to a net user of 
investment funds. This change had a negative impact on private investment. GDP 
growth declined as inflation soared;
(iii) The structural adjustment period and beyond (1986-2006): This period witnessed 
a number of conditionalities and externally determined policy interventions whose 
aims were to contain the economic decline. The result was a lowering of tariffs 
and the reduction of import controls in pursuit of trade liberalization. In order to 
encourage investment, the government implemented several investment schemes, 
duty and tax concessions and incentives. During this period, the policy environment 
was characterized by policy reversals as the government failed to boldly adopt the 
hard policy prescriptions. In 2003, NARC came to power and marked a major change 
in the democratization process. 
External debt was initially the preferred mode of financing revenue gaps. However, 
from the mid 1980s, this changed. The change was occasioned by the frosty relationship 
between Kenya and her development partners on account of her human rights record 
and failure to open up the democratic space. In this period, donors withheld aid to 
force the government to liberalize both economically and politically. The government, 
in order to balance her ever increasing budget, mostly recurrent, resorted to increased 
domestic borrowings. This put extreme pressure on interest rates and inflation (Islam 
and Hasan, 2007). As the pressure to democratize increased, the regime responded with 
more patronage politics (Robinson and Torvik, 2008). This came at a great cost to the 
economy as coalition building expenditure defied any economic rationalization. Such 
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investment crowds-in, and which one crowds-out private investment? 
Objectives of the study
The main objective of this study is to analyse the effects of government investment expenditure and financing on private investment in Kenya.
The specific objectives are to:
(i) Determine the effect of government capital spending and related variables on private 
investment across time and regime. 
(ii) Analyse the effect of different modes of financing public capital spending on private 
investment.
Research questions
The following research questions were used to guide the study:
(i) What is the effect of government investment expenditure in agriculture, and 
infrastructure on private investment? 
(ii) What is the effect of real exchange rate, and political risk on private investments?
(iii) What is the effect of financing (debt and tax financing) of public expenditure on 
private investment?
Justification of the study
In view of the need to rationalize public expenditure given the scarce revenues, the study provides an empirical basis to argue for expenditure re-orientation to such areas 
that provide the maximum benefits. In terms of financing, the study provides empirical 
results on the relationship between tax and debt financing of public expenditure, and 
how this relates to private investment. This is important in debt management and tax 
administration.
The study provides empirical country evidence on the issue of crowding-in and 
crowding-out of private investment by government investment and its mode of financing. 
On political economy, the study provides indication on the effects of different political 
regimes on public expenditure in terms of political behaviour and how it affects 
expenditure patterns and types, and how this in turn affects private investment. The 
period covered has significant political implications as it witnessed a change from a 
multiparty democracy to a single-party democracy, followed by benevolent dictatorship 
and back to multiparty democracy. This had implications on public expenditure, which 
is largely a political decision.
2. Review of literature 
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The period 2003-2006 saw KANU out of office. However, the structure of governance 
remained predominantly KANU. The NARCgovernment soon ran into ideological 
bankruptcy, and open disagreements and grandstanding became the norm rather than 
the exception. These conflicts culminated in the politically defining moment of the 
2005 referendum on the constitution, which saw the collapse of the coalition (Troup 
and Hornsby, 1998). 
Statement of the research problem
Government expenditure and its financing have a far-reaching effect on the overall direction of the economy, and are influenced by the politics of the day. A large 
expenditure budget financed through foreign borrowing adversely affects the country’s 
debt position and the private sector. Kenya, being a highly indebted country aggravates 
this by increased reliance on debt financing. Borrowing turns out to be more costly in the 
long-run, as it crowds out private investment by increasing the cost of doing business. 
The cost of doing business has been high not only because of increased interest rates, but 
also due to dilapidated infrastructure, insecurity, hence increased risks, and high taxes. 
Thus, today, Kenya ranks low as an investment destination. 
Tax-financed expenditure in an economy where the tax base is narrow (largely formal 
employment) and compliance low places a heavy tax burden on a few captive taxpayers. 
These are in turn burdened by high tax rates, which make savings and investment difficult. 
Little has been done in the way of widening the tax base and increasing compliance 
through aggressive tax education. Therefore, in terms of incentives to the private investor, 
it appears that whereas government expenditure and financing could have provided that 
much needed direct and indirect incentives, this has not happened.
In view of the above, evidence in Kenya points to a declining performance of the 
private sector, which has largely been below 15% of GDP in the period 1995-2006. 
This is in contrast to the performance of the private sector in Latin America at 16%, 
in advanced countries at 18%, and in the newly industrialized countries at 16.5% over 
the same period (Oshikoya, 1994). The theoretical and empirical literature shows the 
positive role of the private sector in the growth of the economy. A declining or very low 
performance of the private sector under the given incentives calls for analysis of the 
determinants of private investment to identify the factors behind the low or declining 
share. The problem is, therefore, to explain the private sector's investment behaviour 
in view of government investment expenditure and financing. Does public investment 
and financing crowd-out or crowd-in private investment? Which category of public 
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investment made by firms. Accordingly, the theory argues that firms have two choices 
when faced by an increase in demand. They can either raise prices to cause demand 
to drop, or increase investment to match demand. Therefore, the level of investment 
is dependent on changes in the level of output. If investment is linked to changes in 
output, any policy measure that promotes growth will act as a stimulus for an increase 
in investment (Lucas, 1967). 
In the classical model, supply of funds (savings) determines the amount of fixed 
business investment. That is, since all savings are placed in the banks, and all business 
investors in need of borrowed funds go to the bank, the amount of savings determine 
the amount of available funds for investments. Therefore, in their view, fiscal stimulus 
could actuate production. They argued that the stimulus would outrun the side effect (that 
is crowd-out private investment). Firstly, it would increase the demand for labour and 
raise wages, thus hurting profitability. Secondly, a government deficit would increase the 
stock of government bonds, reducing their market prices in the process (Seater, 1993). 
The neo-classical theory of investment formulated by Jorgensen (1967) posits that 
the level of investment depends on the volume of output and the user cost of capital. 
The user cost of capital, on the other hand, depends on the real interest rate, the price of 
capital goods and the rate of physical depreciation. This is the capital stock adjustment 
model. In this model, investment is seen as the process of changing the capital stock 
from its current actual level to a desired level over time. Gross investment is thus the 
amount of capital needed for new capital stock, plus the amount required to cover for 
depreciation of the existing capital stock.
According to Tobin’s Q theory, investment decision is dependent on the Q-ratio. This 
is the ratio of the market value of existing capital stock to the stock replacement value. 
The argument here is that the enterprise will want to invest/divest if the increase in the 
market value of additional unit exceeds/falls short of the replacement cost. Therefore, 
in this theory, in the absence of capital market imperfections, value maximizing firms 
will invest as long as the shadow price of a marginal unit of capital, Q, exceeds unity. 
Investment stops when the value of this capital unit is equal to its replacement cost (Bo, 
2002, 2007; Bo and Elmer, 2007).
Pindyck (1991) interprets a firm’s investment decisions as consisting of choices on 
different portfolios, and uses options-based pricing techniques to analyse investment 
decisions. Since most fixed investment is irreversible, uncertainty adversely affects 
corporate investment decisions. Such uncertainty would thus influence the choice of 
options. Such uncertainty includes the future trends in product prices, interest rates, 
trade regimes and other economic and political uncertainties. Chen and Funke (2003) 
argue that investment opportunities can be viewed as “option-rights”. In such a situation, 
an investment project can be assimilated in its nature into purchases of a financial call 
6
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Theoretical framework
From a theoretical perspective, the effect of government expenditure on private investments can be either positive or negative. The standard Real Business Cycle 
(RBC) model predicts a decline in private consumption in response to a rise in government 
spending. This is because an increase in government spending lowers the present value 
of after-tax incomes, and thus generates a negative wealth effect on private consumption. 
This is in contrast to the standard IS-LM model, which predicts that consumption should 
rise in response to a positive government spending shock. When consumers behave in a 
non-Ricardian fashion, that is, their consumption is a function of their current disposable 
income, an increase in income generates an increase in private consumption (Long and 
Plosser, 1983).
With respect to investment, the standard RBC model argues that an increase in 
government consumption will have a positive effect on investment. That is, it will induce 
a rise in employment which, if sufficiently persistent, will lead to a rise in the expected 
return to capital, therefore triggering a rise in investment. This is contrary to the IS-LM 
model, which predicts that investment will decline in response to positive government 
spending shocks. An increase in government spending (if not followed by a corresponding 
increase in money supply), leads to an increase in interest rate, which in turn will lead 
to a decrease in investment (Ambler, Cardia and Zimmerman, 2004; Long and Plosser, 
1983; Lucas, 1980; Rebelo, 2005).
A large budget financed largely through foreign borrowing affects the debt levels and 
increases the debt burden. Domestic borrowing to finance the expenditure may adversely 
affect private investment by reducing savings and crowding-out private investors from 
the domestic capital market as financial institutions prefer lending to the government. It is 
intuitive that if there is sufficient liquidity in the financial system, then public borrowing 
(debt financing) may not affect private investment negatively as interest rates will not 
be affected significantly. If expenditure is tax-financed, then high taxes reduce the after 
tax returns to private investment, and thus affect private investment negatively (David 
and Scadding, 1974; Seater, 1993; Bo, 2007). 
There is a rich body of literature on the analysis of the determinants of private 
investment and the mechanism through which such determinants affect private 
investment. The interest in the literature can be traced to Keynes investment theories 
(1936). Keynes argued that investment was largely determined by the “animal spirit of 
men”. Keynes further argued that savings and investment must be identical ex-post, but 
ex-ante, a difference emerges driven by the fact that savings and investments emanate 
from independent decisions. In Keynes' view, fiscal policy causes minimal crowding-out 
of private investment when unemployment is persistently high, above the non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment (Seater, 1993). 
The accelerator theory argues that investment demand is a function of the rate of 
growth of output. In this theory, the incentive to acquire more capital goods arises 
not because the current profit records are favourable, but because increases in outputs 
are putting pressure on firms’ existing productive capacity. An increase in productive 
capacity requires an expansion of the capital stock, which in turn calls for a higher rate 
of investment spending. As demand and income increases in an economy, so does the 
8 reSearCh paper 236
that public investment crowds-in private investment.
The cross country studies focused broadly on similar determinants across the countries. 
They sought to find out if there was crowding-in or crowding-out of private investment 
by public expenditure. They came to a general conclusion that public consumption 
expenditure crowds-out private investment. With regard to public investment, the 
evidence was that infrastructural investment crowds-in private investment. Such studies 
include that of Sturm and de Haan (1995) reviewing the empirical evidence for USA and 
Netherlands, Atukeren (2005) on evidence from developing countries, Aschauer (1989) 
in the US and Netherlands study, and the study by Erden and Holcombe (2006) on the 
developed countries. The panel study of 145 countries by Furceri and Sousa (2009), 
and using time series data for the period 1960-2007, found that government spending 
produces important crowding-out effect by negatively affecting both private consumption 
and investment. There are other cross country studies whose findings are basically in 
agreement with the above. Such studies include Ahmed and Miller (2000), Chibber and 
Mansoor (1990), Erenburg and Wohar (1995), Greene and Villanueva (1991), Wai and 
Wong (1982), Karras (1994), Kormendi (1983), Ford and Poret (1991), Evans and Karras 
(1994) and Bouton and Sumlinski (2000).
There are some studies whose findings were divergent to those discussed above. The 
study by Sundararajan and Thakur (1980) concluded that there is both a crowding-out 
and a crowding-in effect. Firstly, public investment competes with the private sector for 
scarce physical and financial resources, thereby exerting a negative influence on private 
investment, at least in the short-run. Secondly, public investment compliments private 
investment by creating infrastructure and thus raising productivity of the capital stock, 
and reduces the cost of doing business thus crowding-in private investment. Finally, 
they observed that public investment raises aggregate output and savings, supplementing 
the economy’s physical and financial resources, thus offsetting at least a part of any 
initial crowding-out effect on private investment. A study by Devaranjan, Swaroop and 
Zou (1996) found a positive effect of government current expenditure on growth for 
43 developing countries. They argued that the expenditure on this category of negative 
effect must have gone beyond the optimal level. It, therefore, appears that productive 
expenditures may be unproductive if they go beyond the optimum. This finding brings in 
the issue of how much expenditure is productive and how much is counter-productive. In 
a study by Argimon, Gonzales and Rolden (1997), they found that public consumption 
and public investment negatively affect private investment.
The studies focusing on financing of public expenditure and their effect on private 
investment are few. The study by Barro (1990) is probably the earliest studies on this 
issue. This study focused on the tax-financed government expenditure on investment 
and output. It concluded that higher income taxes reduce the after-tax returns on private 
investment and thus negatively affect investment. Ahmed and Miller (2000) examined 
the effects of different fiscal variables on domestic investment. They also distinguished 
between debt and tax-financed public expenditure. Using pooled time series data for 
39 countries, they found that tax-financed government expenditure crowds-out private 
investment more than debt-financed expenditure. 
Despite the above theoretical and empirical studies, there is no consensus on the 
effects of government spending on private investment in the long-run and the short-run. 
Government Capital SpendinG and FinanCinG and itS impaCt on private inveStment in Kenya: 1964-2006 9
option, where the investor pays a premium price to get the right to buy an asset. Such 
assets are bought at a pre-determined price (exercise price), which eventually differs from 
the spot market price of the asset (strike price). Therefore, in any investment decision, a 
firm pays a price which gives it the right to use the capital now or in the future in return 
for an asset worth the strike price. In this analysis, it is important to take cognizant of 
the fact that: (i) There is uncertainty about future payoffs from an investment; (ii) an 
investment does not entail a now-or-never decision; and (iii) the investment is at least 
partially irreversible. 
A distortionary tax-financed increase in government expenditure will have a less 
expansionary effect on the long-run private capital stock than a lumpsum tax (debt) 
financed increase, if and only if, the higher public investment requires a higher long-run 
tax rate (Fisher and Turnovsky, 1998). In case of Cobb-Douglas production function, 
distortionary tax financing will ensure a positive long-run effect on the private capital 
stock. If the share of government capital in production exceeds the long-run claim of 
government investment in output, tax will have a positive effect (Linnemann and Schabert, 
2004; Islam and Hasan, 2007). 
Empirical studies
Empirical studies on the determinants of private investments are varied in their conclusions with regard to the relationship between private investment and public 
investment. There are various studies that focused on developing countries, either as 
individual country studies or as cross country studies. Some studies have also focused 
on developed countries individually or as cross country study of developed countries 
or developing countries.
Some studies have been done under the African Economic Research Consortium 
network, which focused on individual country case studies. Three of these are directly 
relevant to this study and will be reviewed alongside other documented studies. They 
are the Nigerian studies of Omoke and Busari (2008), Ekpo (1999), the Ghanaian study 
by Asante (2000), Zimbabwean study of Jenkins (1998), Sudan by Badawi (2002), 
Kenyan studies by Ronge and Kimuyu (1992), Wachira (1991), Matin and Wasow 
(1992), the Portuguese study by Pereira and Andraz (2005), the Pakistan studies by 
Abdul (2005), Ahmed and Qayyum (2008), Hyder (2001), the Taiwan study by Ho 
(2001), the US study by Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994), Islam and Hasan (2007), 
the Bangladesh study by Majumder (2007), the Turkey study by Akkina and Celebi 
(2002); the Mexican study by Feltenstein and Ha (1999); and the study on Spain by 
Bajo and Sosvilla (1993). The results of these studies are not unanimous with regard to 
crowding-out and crowding-in. What is unambiguous is the fact that GDP growth, and 
investment in both economic and social infrastructure, crowds-in private investment. 
Quattara (2004), investigating the determinants of private investment in Senegal, found 
that public investment, real income and foreign aid flows affect private investment 
positively. The impact of credit to private sector and terms of trade were negative. In 
a recent study on Benin, Issouf (2008) using structural VAR on annual data found a 
significant effect of public investment and private investment on growth, and concludes 
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LIVG 1.14 0.49 0.82 2.44
POR 6.39 2.22 2.80 9.90
Correlation matrix
 LPRIN LREX LDBT LTAX LEDT LINFR LIVG POR
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It is clear that the predictions of the above theories are orthogonal to each other; hence 
the relationship between government investment and private investment still remains 
an empirical issue.
3. Methodology
Data description and sources of data
The study used time series data for GDP, private investment, investment in agriculture, and investment in infrastructure. The investment figures were taken as the gross 
capital formation. All variables are expressed in real terms. The GDP deflator was used 
to convert nominal GDP into real GDP. The data on real gross private investment was 
calculated by multiplying the ratio of gross private capital formation to GDP by real 
GDP. Real investment in agriculture, and infrastructure was computed by multiplying the 
respective ratio of gross investments to GDP by real GDP. Real tax revenues are taken 
as the ratio of gross tax revenues to GDP multiplied by real GDP. Real external debt and 
domestic debt is the ratio of the individual debt to GDP multiplied by real GDP. Political 
risk was measured by an instability index. The study adopted the polity index used by 
Monty and Cole (2009). The index rates a country based on political behaviour. This 
scale ranges from -10 (Hereditary Monarchy) to +10 (Consolidated Democracy). The 
risk ratings are the reverse of the above, being lowest in consolidated democracy and 
highest in hereditary monarchy. The most risky is rated as +10 and the least risky as +1.
The main source of data was the African Development Indicators, World Development 
Indicators, World Development Finance, and International Finance Statistics. These 
sources were augmented by various issues of Statistical Abstracts of the Government of 
Kenya. The data on political risk was sourced from Polity IV project, Freedom House 
data and the PRS group.
Descriptive statistics
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev Min. Max.
LPRIN 2.76 0.22 2.26 3.14
LREX 2.98 0.95 1.93 4.36 
LDBT 1.64 1.06 0.26 3.78
LTAX 3.03 0.24 2.39 3.40 
LEDT 2.43 1.18 0.92 4.48
LINFR 1.96 0.21 1.67 2.44
11
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 (2)
Where ECMt-1 = (x - y)t-1. 
The variables are stationary in first difference and are cointegrated. A cointegration 
analysis shows the existence of a long-term relationship between private investment and 
its determinants, in this ,while an error correction representation allows for adjustment 
towards long-run equilibrium in case of a temporary short-run disturbance from the 
equilibrium.
5. Empirical results
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LPRIN 1.000       
LREX -0.076 1.000      
LDBT -0.643 -0.312 1.000     
LTAX -0.542 -0.541 -0.285 1.000    
LEDT -0.162 -0.652 -0.094 0.489 1.000   
LINFR 0.329 0.094 0.079 0.464 0.097 1.000  
LIVG 0.718 0.579 0.514 0.017 0.127 0.521 1.000 
POR -0.341 -0.713 0.428 -0.245 -0.489 -0.294 -0.172 1.000
The correlation matrix shows that the variables are normally correlated both with the 
dependent variable and with respect to each other.
4. Economic model
The dynamic private investment model is represented as an error correction framework on the basis of the fact that time series data are non-stationary, and that there is cointegration relationship between private investment and its 
determinants. The error correction representation is given as:
  (1)
where yt is an endogenous variable, yt-1 is the lagged value of the endogenous variable, 
xit are the exogenous variables, (x - y)t-1 is the error correction term, ∆ is the difference 
operator, εt is the white noise error term distributed as an iid and ϕ is the coefficient of 
the error correction term, which measures the degree of adjustment to equilibrium, β0 
is intercept coefficient, α1 is the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, and βi is a 
slope coefficient of the exogenous variables.
From Equation 1, the empirical model is presented as follows:
13
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r=4 56.41 59.46
r=5 33.29 39.89
r=6 17.70 24.31
r=7 8.57 12.53
r=8 5.72 6.51
Source: Maddala and Kim (1998).
NB: ** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% significant level.
The trace statistics rejects the null hypothesis of the existence of zero or one 
cointegrating relationships in the private investment equation (also refer to the 
cointegration graphs in A3 in the appendix). 
Identification
From Table 4 and Table 5, there are two cointegrating vectors between the variables: Private investment and its determinants. Error terms from these two 
cointegrating vectors are presented in Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5. The long-run private 
investment function is obtained by normalizing the first estimated cointegrating vector 
on private investment and its determinants. The result of this normalization is given in 
Table 6.
Table 6: Normalization of first cointegrating vector
Variables Coefficient Standard errors T-values
LIVG 1.265* 0.127 12.541
LDBT -1.476* 0.117 -5.982
LTAX -0.897 0.097 -2.373
LEDT -0.124 0.561 -1.989
LINFR  0.974 0.119  2.097
LREX -1.219 0.105 -1.998
POR -0.098 0.122 -1.786
LPRIN-1 1.342 0.087  2.037
(*) represent significant at 5% critical values.
The estimated coefficients of LIVG and LDBT are significant and bear a priori signs. 
It indicates that private investment is determined by investment in agriculture, and 
domestic debts with elasticity of 1.267 and -1.476, respectively. 
Table 7: Test for long-run weak exogeneity (Ho: variable is weakly exogenous 
to cointegrating vector)
14
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Table 3: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Philip Peron test for unit roots
Variables  ADF- PP Results 1st  ADF- PP
in levels stats stats  Difference stats Stats
LPRIN  - 2.872 -2.112  I(1) “LPRIN -8.086 -11.891
LREX  -0.098 -0.314 I(1) “REX -7.009  -9.325
LDBT  -1.156 -1.686 I(1) “LDBT -5.445  -6.573
LTAX  -2.878 -2.543 I(1) “LTAX  -5.871  -6.879
LEDT -0.905 -1.235 I(1) “LEDT -5.812  -6.792
LINFR  -0.592 -0.783 I(1) “LINFR -7.763 -10.712
LIVG   -1.504 -1.239 I(1) “LIVG  -5.851  -6.315
POR  -2.900 -2.934 I(1) ”POR  -7.468  -9.987
Critical values for ADF at 5%=-3.50, 1%=4.15, *significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
PP test at 5%=-3.463, 1%=-3.157. NB: All variables are in logs except POR. 
The null hypothesis (Ho: I (1)) is not rejected at 5% and 1% levels, therefore 
necessitating further testing in first difference. All the series are differenced except 
the POR. The differenced series reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis of stationarity. Therefore, the series are stationary after first differencing. 
Both the PP tests and the ADF tests accept the stationarity in first difference at both the 
1% and 5%.
The results thus provide ground for cointegration analysis. The variables entering 
cointegration analysis are ∆LPRIN, ∆LREX, ∆LDBT, ∆LTAX, ∆LEDT, ∆LINFR, 
∆LIVG, ∆POR and ∆LPRIN−1. The Johansen’s cointegration results are presented in 
Table 4 and Table 5. 
Table 4: Johansen’s integration rank test 
Hypothesis Max-Eigen Statistic 95% critical value
Ho: r  (λmax) 
r= 0 85.78 65.21
r 1 69.33 59.78
r 2 40.12 53.90 
r 3 33.25 47.15 
r 4 26.23 41.00 
r 5 21.63 35.17 
r 6 16.07 28.82 
r 7 10.19 22.99 
r 8 4.41 15.69
Table 5: Johansen’s test for the number of cointegrating vectors 
Ho:r  Trace statistic 95% critical value
r=0 216.58 175.77**
r=1 166.58 141.20**
r=2 106.61 109.99
r=3 80.80 82.49
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significant long-run effect on private investment.
The empirical evidence on investment in agriculture in the long-run indicates that 
the effect is positive and significant. It can be argued that Kenya, being an agriculture 
economy with over 70% of the population being directly or indirectly employed in 
agriculture, would do well to focus investment in this sector. A stimulus in the agriculture 
sector has an expenditure multiplier effect that stimulates demand and in turn has a 
positive effect on private investment (the accelerator theory).
Domestic debt has negative and significant effect; this implies that in the long-run, debt 
increases the cost of financing by pushing up the interest rates. This negatively affects 
private investors. Apart from increasing the cost through an increase in interest rate, 
domestic debt can also be inflationary if used largely to finance government consumption 
expenditure. During the larger part of this period, government consumption expenditure 
increased, while investment as a percentage of total expenditure declined. Domestic debt 
affects private investment with a lag. This is because debt works through the interest 
rate and inflation channels to affect private investment. 
Short-run dynamic model of private investment: 
The error correction approach
The cointegrating vector β' in Table 8 constitutes a restricted long-run stationary relationship, and describes the error correction term.
ECT= LPRIN-0.907LREX - 1.436LDBT - 0.794LTAX -1.185LEDT + 
 1.032LINFR + 1.645LIVG - 0.587POR + 0.179 LPRIN
-1
 (3)
The error correction model involves the estimation of the model in stationary forms 
of the variables and adding an error correction term as another explanatory variable. 
The modelling approach adopted here is the “general to specific”. In this approach, 
the study starts with three lags, and sequentially reduces the lags until the model consists 
of only significant parameters. Three lags were chosen as the starting point due to the 
many parameters being estimated and the data point (annual data). All variables are 
in first difference. The results of the estimated parsimonious dynamic error correction 
model are shown in Table 10.
A statistically negative significant coefficient of the ECMt-1 suggests that market 
forces are operating to restore long-run equilibrium following short-run disturbances. 
Table 10: Error-Correction Model of private investment [∆LPRIN]
Explanatory variable Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
∆LPRIN-1 +0.172 0 084 +2.05 
∆LREX-1 -0.077 0.130 -0.597
∆LDBT-2 -0.142 0.077 -4.385
continued next page
Table 10 Continued
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Variable  (prob) Decision over Ho. Inference
LPRIN 4.153(0.05) Rejection Not exogenous
LREX 1.003(0.54) Acceptance Exogenous
LDBT 3.967(0.08)  Rejection Not exogenous
LTAX 2.105(0.65) Acceptance Exogenous
LEDT 2.456(0.39) Acceptance  Exogenous
LINFR 1.982(0.73) Acceptance Exogenous
LIVG 4.751(0.09) Rejection Not exogenous
POR 0.654(0.81) Acceptance Exogenous
LPRIN-1 0.010(0.93) Acceptance Exogenous
Respective α coefficients on variables are linearly restricted to equal zero. The linear 
hypothesis of zero alphas on LDBT, LTAX, LEDT, LINFR, POR and LPRIN
-1
 are 
accepted, since associated likelihood ratio  values are insignificant (p-probability in 
parentheses). Long-run weak exogeneity does not characterize LDBT and LIVG. Since 
the reported likelihood values are significant, we reject the null of weak exogeneity. We 
also run similar weak exogeneity test for LPRIN. This is also rejected indicating that a 
significant long-run stationary feedback to LPRIN exists. 
Considering the conclusions from Table 7, the long-run exogeneity of LREX, LTAX, 
LEDT, LINFR, POR, and LPRIN
-1
 are used to re-estimate the model. We preserve the 
cointegrating rank of two and impose one long-run restriction on respective adjustment 
coefficients on LREX, LTAX, LEDT, LINFR, POR, and LPRIN
-1
 (no restriction on βs 
except identifying restrictions). Resultant restricted standardized αs and βs are shown 
in Table 8 and Table 9.
Table 8: Restricted co-integrated vector
 ∆LPRIN ∆LREX ∆LDBT ∆LTAX ∆ LEDT ∆LINFR ∆LIVG ∆POR ∆LPRIN-1
(a) Restricted standardized eigenvectors β'
β' 1.00 - 0.907 -1.436 -0.794 -1.185 1.032 1.645 -0.587 0.179
 (rest.) (2.246) (-7.105) (-1.976) (-2.421) (3.125) (9.274) (-2.271) (2.795)
α
Table 9: Restricted standardized adjustment coefficients α:
∆LPRIN -0.467(-3.428)
∆LREX  0.000(rest.)
∆LDBT -0.832(-3.609)
∆LTAX  0.000 (rest.)
∆LEDT  0.000(rest.)
∆LINFR  0.000(rest.)
∆LIVG  0.977 (4.299)
∆POR  0.000(rest.)
∆LPRIN-1  0.000(rest.)
t-statistics are in parentheses
The result shows that real domestic debt and real investment in agriculture have 
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heteroscedasticity-test; F- statistics = 11.937[0.7483]; Serial-correlation test F-statistics=0.372[0.0794], 
Normality test x2=3.9231.
The residuals were subjected to a number of diagnostic tests such as linearity, 
autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and normality. The results for the 
test were positive at the 5% level. Thus, the residuals passed these tests.
The error correction term, ECM
-1
 in the estimated equation is significant and with 
the correct sign. ECM
-1
 shows that 65% of the disequilibrium in the private investment 
is corrected immediately, i.e. in the next year. 
In the estimated dynamic error correction model, the coefficient of the lagged domestic 
debt is negative and significant. This shows that debt financed government expenditure 
crowds-out private investment through heavy tax burdens that reduce profitability, reduce 
disposable income and therefore consumption, and increases inflation if government 
expenditure is for recurrent budget. During this period, government expenditure moved in 
favour of recurrent expenditure. As the government continued to look inward for funding, 
and given the financially repressed domestic market with government controlled banks, 
the private investor got locked out of financing.
The coefficient of investment in agriculture is positive and significant and substantially 
large. This shows the centrality of agriculture in the Kenyan economy. Over 70% of the 
total population is dependent on agriculture for a livelihood. Investment in agriculture 
affects private investment through the demand and supply side. The domestic market is 
thus affected by the performance of the agricultural sector. Agriculture being the source 
of income indirectly affects the quality of labour as private funds for education come 
from agriculture. Thus, agriculture indirectly affects the quality of labour and the labour 
participation rate. 
The other determinants, though having the expected signs, are insignificant. Lagged 
changes in private investment show the herding behaviour of investors. Real exchange 
rates working through the cost side affect private investment. External debt through debt 
overhang negatively affects private investment, and the tax rates are ‘nearly’ significant. 
This attests to the negative effect on private investment of tax-financed government 
expenditure if the tax revenue goes largely to finance recurrent expenditure. This 
unfortunately has been the trend in public finance in Kenya. 
Investment in infrastructure has an insignificant positive effect. This is because 
investment in infrastructure takes a long time to complete, and also given the pressure 
on the budget, not much infrastructural investment has been forthcoming. A lot of the 
infrastructural investments are the subject of investigations due to over-invoicing and cost 
adjustment, accounting issues and tendering problems. The effect of political instability, 
though having the correct sign is insignificant. This can be explained by the fact that 
compared to the rest of the Horn of Africa and, indeed the entire sub-Saharan Africa, 
Kenya has been relatively stable with many of the economic fundamentals favouring 
private investment. Kenya also offers a substantially well qualified professional and 
experienced cheap labour force. These advantages may have over-ridden the political 
instability witnessed during the single-party rule. 
6. Econometric issues
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Explanatory variable Coefficient Standard error t-ratio
∆LEDT  -0.154 0. 018 -0.938
∆LTAX-1 -0.063 0.269 -2.549
“LIVG 0.644 0.798 +8.421
“LINFR 0.221 0.199 +1.112
“POR -0.016 0.013 -1.534
ECM-1 -0.651 0.153 -5.341
Constant -0. 030 0.048 -2.320
R2 =0.8015; F=15.631[0.000]; ** Adjusted R2 =0.7451; Sum of squared residuals=0.1891 log likelihood 37.932 
DW=2.03 
Schwarz Criterion=-1.975; Akaike Inform Criteria= -2.890 Prob. of (F-statistics= [0.0030].
Diagnostic tests
Ramsey’s RESET (test for linearity) = 2.O65 [0.017] “LM-test’ (test for Autocorrelation) x2 (1) = 3.2798; White 
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of heteroscedasticity in the error terms µt. The second advantage is that a user does not 
have to specify a lag length for the test regression. As such the Phillips-Perron (PP) test 
gives the same result as the ADF, and the critical values are similar to those of the ADF 
tests (Enders, 1995; Stock and Watson, 1993; Munnell, 1990). The test confirms the 
results of the ADF unit root test (Table 5.1). 
Modelling cointegration: The autoregressive formulation
Since all ∆yt...∆yt-k+1, are all I (0) but yt is I (1), in order for this estimation to be consistent, then Πi should not be a full rank. Let the full rank be n and the reduced 
rank be r. If n=r, then the variables in yi are I (0), while if the rank of Πi is zero, then there 
are no cointegrating relations (Harris, 1995; Johansen and Juselius, 2000). Usually, in 
modelling such relationships, Πi assumes reduced rank; that is r (n-1), this gives us: 
Πi=αβ 
'. Where ± is an n x r matrix and β ' is an r x n matrix. β Xt-1are the r cointegrated 
variables, β ' is the matrix of coefficient of the cointegrating vectors, that is the long-
run coefficient, and ± has the interpretation of the matrix of the error correction terms. 
The cointegrating coefficients are the weights in the linear combination, which reduces 
the variables to stationarity. The cointegrating vector is usually normalized on one of 
the variables. An invalid normalization arises if the variable on which the cointegrating 
relationship is normalized has a zero coefficient (Boswijk, 1996; Lutkepohl, 2004; 
Doornik and Hendry, 2001; Hendry and Juselius, 1999; Granger and Newbold, 1974).
The rank of the matrix Πi, that is the number of cointegrating relation(s) was 
determined using the two commonly used likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics as provided 
in Johansen (1988): the trace statistic(λtrace ) and the maximum eigenvalue(λmax) with 
their test statistics given as:
 (6)
 (7)
Where λi is the i-th largest eigenvalues of the Πi matrix in Equation 7. This test was 
conducted under the null of r=0 and then r=1.
The trace test, tests the hypothesis that there are at most r cointegrating vectors, while 
the maximum eigenvalue test, tests the hypothesis that there are r+1 cointegrating vectors 
versus the hypothesis that there are r cointegrating vectors.20
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Unit root analysis
It is important to ascertain the order of integration, i.e. the presence or absence of unit roots in the time series. In testing for unit root, the H0: is simply φ = 0, i.e., there is a 
unit root in yt = φyt-1 + µt against the one-sided alternative of φ <1
φ <.H0: series contains 
a unit root against H1: series is stationary. In this test, the commonly used regression is:
∆yt + ψyt-1 + µt  (4)
so that a test of φ = 1 is equivalent to a test of ψ = 0 (since φ - 1 = ψ). This is based 
on Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF). A series is stationary if φ <1, where φ is the 
coefficient of the explanatory variable and φ - 1 = ψ, if φ = 1 then ψ = 0. If the final 
model includes a constant and deterministic trend, the critical Dickey-Fuller value at 
5% is -3.41, while the value for a 1% is -3.96. On the other hand, the corresponding 
values for a constant and no deterministic trend are -2.86 and -3.43, respectively, for 
finite sample size (Maddalla and Kim, 1998; Sjoo, 2003). 
Given that all the variables are non-stationary at 5% and 1% levels, that is, they are 
all I (1) variables (Table 5.1) and that they become stationary after first differencing, a 
cointegration test was carried out to determine whether the variables are cointegrated. 
The Phillips-Perron test
The Phillips-Perron (PP) test differs from the ADF tests mainly on how it deals with serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the errors. The tests are non-parametric 
and avoid the problem of serial correlation in the error terms without adding lagged 
differenced terms. The tests are similar to the ADF tests, but differ from the latter in that 
they incorporate an automatic correction to the ADF procedure to allow for autocorrelated 
residuals. The tests are usually interpreted in the same manner as the ADF tests. The 
test is presented as:
 ∆yt = β 
'Dt + πyt-1 +µt (5)
Where  µt is I (0) and may be heteroscedastic, Dt contains deterministic components 
(constant or constant plus time trend). The PP test corrects for any serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity in the errors µt of the test regression by directly modifying the test 
statistics tπ = o and Tπ.
Under the null hypothesis that π = 0, the PP Zt and Zπ statistics have the same 
asymptotic distributions as the ADF t-statistic and normalized bias statistic. One 
advantage of the PP tests over the ADF tests is that the former are robust to general forms 
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(Patterson, 2000; Johansen, 1991)
Determining the lag length
In order to determine the lag length, the paper used the sequential rule discussed by Hall (1994). This rule, known as the general to specific rule, begins with a large value of 
, tests the significance of the last coefficient and reducesκ iteratively until a 
significant statistic is encountered. Setting higher lags and reducing them by eliminating 
insignificant lags downwards as far as possible would give the correct lag length. 
However, care was taken not to destroy the assumption of white noise variables and 
without compromising on the degrees of freedom. The LM test, the Durbin Watson test, 
the F-test and the white test were done to check for misspecification.
Error correction
This is a dynamic system with the characteristics that a deviation of the current state from its long-run relationship will be fed into its short-run dynamics. This model 
is therefore important in that it provides a consistent integration of short-run dynamic 
adjustments with long-run equilibrium specification as indicated by the dynamic 
relationship specified below: 
yt=β0+β1xt+β2xt-1+αyt-1+µt (8)
∆yt=β0+β1∆xt+ϕ(xt-1-yt-1)+ut (9)
Where ϕ(xt-1-yt-1) is the error correction term.
7. Conclusions and policy implications
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To identify the model, we imposed zero and exclusion restriction, we also imposed 
identifying restriction on β. In doing so, we denoted the column of β as βi, a k x 1 vector 
and the vector/matrix of restrictions on βi as Ri of dimension gi x k. Then the exclusion 
restriction is Ri βi=Ci, where Ci is a gi x 1 vector of constants with Ri being a g x k vector 
and Ci=0. There is no redundancy restriction on Ri, which therefore has rank gi; and Ri 
has rank=1. 
Suppose there are r cointegrating vectors, and assuming a normalization has 
been imposed, i.e. one element in each βi has been normalized to 1, then for generic 
identification, there must be at least r-1 independent restrictions of the form Ri βi=0 
placed on each cointegrating vector. In the problem under analysis, since r=2, there are 
2-1=1 restrictions. Since Ri is a gi x k, to identify the i
th cointegrating vector, gi r-1. 
Certainly, if gi r-1, the cointegrating vector cannot be identified. This condition is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition (Patterson, 2000; Lutkepohl, 2004). Given the 
decomposition Π=αβ', the identification of the parameters in β' requires the imposition 
of at least r-1 a priori restrictions on each of the cointegrating vectors. A necessary and 
sufficient condition for the identification of the long-run parameters is that rank{R(Ir
β)}=r2. Thus, the exact identification of the cointegrating relationships of a long-run 
private investment is given as:
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The empirical discussion in this paper reveals that private investment is positively and significantly affected by public investment in agriculture. Domestic debt has a significantly negative effect. In the short-run, investment in agriculture has a 
significant positive effect. Domestic debt has a significant negative effect on private 
investment. In view of the emphasis on the privatization and the realized need for the 
role of private sector as indicated in the government policy documents, public investment 
in agriculture has an important role to play in stimulating private investment. Therefore, 
the government drive to invest more in agriculture is a move in the right direction. 
Being an agriculture-based economy where over 70% of the population is dependent 
on agriculture, an agricultural stimulus package would, through the crowding-in effect, 
have a multiplier effect in the economy. 
The policy issue in stimulating private investment is to sustain investment in 
agriculture at sufficiently high levels in the long-run. This would entail sustained 
budgetary resource allocations in sufficiently large measures. Debt financing of the 
public expenditure needs to be used cautiously as they tend to negatively affect private 
investment. In terms of financing, debt and tax financing need to be efficiently used as 
they tend to crowd out private investment. 
The need to stimulate demand without inflation is important. This will be possible 
by encouraging domestic production. Agricultural production seems to provide this 
avenue. Public development expenditure needs to be increased as it has the twin effect 
of reducing  cost and encouraging agricultural development. Both have positive effects 
on private investment. 
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Appendix
A1: Derivation of error correction model
∆yt=β0+β1∆xt+ϕ(xt-1-yt-1)+ut
If yt=y* and xt=x* for all t, and if µt=0, then y*=β0+β1x*+β2x*+α1y* then
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(1-α1)y*=β0+(β1+β2)x* therefore y*=β0/1-α1+(β1+β2/1-α1)
Let ϕ =1-α1, and β2=ϕ -β2 where ϕ is the common value of β1+β2=1-α1.
yt=β0+β1x1+(ϕ -β1)xt-1+(1-ϕ)yt-1+µt
Therefore yt=β0+β1xt-β1xt-1+ϕxt-1-ϕyt-1+yt-1+µt
Implies that yt-yt-1=β0+β1(xt-xt-1)+ϕ (xt-1-yt-1)+µt
Finally ∆yt=β0+β1∆xt+ϕ (xt-1-yt-1)+µt
A2: Table AR(1) with a drift and a time trend t-test
Sample size 1%, 5%
25 -4.38  -3.60
50 -4.15  -3.50
100 -4.04  -3.45
250 -3.99  -3.43
500 -3.98  -3.42
“ -3.96  -3.41
Adopted from Maddala and Kim (1998)
A3: Cointegration graph
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